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The Welfare Explosion: Mass Society versus Social Control

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Kirsten A. Grønberg's "mass society" thesis is the most significant alternative to Piven and Cloward's "social control" explanation of the welfare explosion. Grønberg's analysis, however, suffers from problems of conceptualization, measurement, and evidence. In this article these two competing perspectives are reviewed and empirical measures developed to assess the validity of one over the other. Contrary to Grønberg's results, this analysis offers support for the "social control" as opposed to the "mass society" thesis.

As David A. Rochefort has suggested, two schools of thought dominate contemporary analyses of the role of social welfare in Western societies: the progressive or liberal perspective and the neo-Marxist or social control perspective.¹ Both perspectives have been employed in recent years to explain the dramatic growth in the number of families receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Recently, Kirsten A. Grønberg has employed a variation of the liberal perspective and provided an empirical test of her account of the welfare explosion.² In several respects, Grønberg's analysis parallels but contradicts the major neo-Marxist explanation of the welfare explosion as articulated by Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward.³ In the following analysis, we highlight the parallel but contradictory nature of these two competing perspectives and provide an empirical test to suggest the validity of one perspective over the other.

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The Welfare Explosion Puzzle

Between 1950 and 1960, the number of families receiving AFDC grew 17 percent; however, in the next decade, the AFDC rolls grew 158 percent and by 1975 had begun to stabilize at a level that represented a 353 percent increase over 1960.⁴ Most of this growth was concentrated in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and between 1965 and 1975 the rolls grew by 220 percent.⁵ What were the primary factors behind this acute, unprecedented extension of welfare to the poor?

Several analysts have pointed to the migration of over 3 million blacks, many of them poor, between 1945 and 1965, from southern states with stringent welfare policies to northern states with more liberal welfare practices.⁶ Others have emphasized the increases in the formation of female-headed poor black families that were intensified by the migration north and grew sharply by the 1960s.⁷ Still others have stressed the increased need of the poor in the face of their increasing structural unemployment in the 1960s.⁸ We have also been reminded that the Civil Rights Movement, the nation's "rediscovery" of poverty in the early 1960s, and the Johnson Administration's War on Poverty encouraged many poor to forego their reluctance to take welfare and apply for assistance.⁹ Analysts have also stressed the increased professionalism of social welfare bureaucracies¹⁰ or have pointed to the lax administration of welfare programs by those bureaucracies¹¹ as the primary causes of the welfare explosion.

The issue of the welfare explosion continues to be a source of fundamental controversy among those who seek to explain the intent and purpose of public welfare, and the progressive and neo-Marxist perspectives have been applied to the welfare explosion.¹² Neo-Marxist analysts of the social welfare state, such as Piven and Cloward, have argued that welfare operates to perform social control functions in mature capitalistic political economies; and during times of social unrest and political instability, the state is driven inexorably to ease the access of the poor to welfare so as to co-opt them and perpetuate the legitimacy of the political economy in spite of its failure to create economic opportunities for the poor.¹³ Liberals have suggested that the social welfare state represents a basically humanitarian response by the state to social problems endemic to industrialized societies.¹⁴ This perspective, however, has been in need of revision in order to account for the rapid growth of the welfare rolls in the 1960s and early 1970s.¹⁵ In 1977, Kirsten A. Grønbjerg put forward such a revision that now stands as the most explicit and comprehensive alternative to Piven and Cloward's neo-Marxist account of the welfare explosion.¹⁶

For Grønbjerg, in the 1960s, the welfare explosion was the result of the acceleration of the United States toward a "mass society," where

all persons are seen by the state as having legitimate entitlements as citizens.¹⁷ The movement toward a “mass society” constitutes an expansion in the concept of citizenship beyond basic political rights to include social and economic rights.¹⁸ In a “mass society,” poor people as citizens are vested with the right to receive government assistance when their basic social and economic rights cannot legitimately be fulfilled through private means. This expansion of citizenship, in Grønbjerg’s terminology, constitutes part of the process by which the “center” incorporates the “periphery.”

Grønbjerg revises the liberal perspective in an important way to account for the welfare explosion. She emphasizes that the state accords assistance to the poor because they are entitled to it as citizens and suggests that this is different from allowing the poor access to welfare on the basis of need. In other words, receipt of public assistance is a right all citizens can invoke when they have a legitimate basis for doing so rather than a privilege the state accords them when it so wishes.¹⁹ This constitutes a revision of the liberal idea that welfare responds to need and enables Grønbjerg to account for the dramatic growth in the AFDC rolls that far surpassed any increases in need in the 1960s and 1970s.

Parallelism: Mass Society versus Social Control

In spite of her revisionism, Grønbjerg’s analysis still represents a liberal account of the welfare explosion that rejects Piven and Cloward’s conception of the role and function of welfare in our political economy. We actually have two parallel perspectives that view the welfare explosion in three contradictory ways.²⁰ First, Grønbjerg sees a relatively rapid shift in society’s commitment to public assistance, but she emphasizes, as liberals before her, that it constitutes part of a secular trend toward what she refers to as a “mass society.”²¹ Alternatively, Piven and Cloward see the growth of welfare as, historically, part of a cyclical process in capitalist societies wherein welfare is expanded during times of political instability and contracted during times of relative social peace.²² Second, although Grønbjerg stresses the expansion of the concept of citizenship rather than growth in needs as the force behind the welfare explosion, she reinforces the liberal notion that the welfare explosion is reflective of a positive, humanitarian trend in society and that the expansion of citizenship as such is a good.²³ Conversely, Piven and Cloward suggest that the welfare explosion reflects less the humanitarianism of the social welfare state than its “latent” functions to assist the state in performing social control.²⁴ Third, Grønbjerg’s analysis implies that

the growth of welfare rolls is a manifestation of the integration of the poor (periphery) into the mainstream of society (center) by virtue of the expansion of citizenship.²⁵ Piven and Cloward's analysis, however, implies that the welfare explosion reflects the limited extent to which the state is willing to go to incorporate the poor and serves to perpetuate the poor as a relatively permanent "underclass" who suffer from isolation from the mainstream of our society.²⁶

The parallelism of these two competing perspectives is also reflected in the contradictory ways they interpret the same developments as important factors in the welfare explosion. Grønbjerg suggests that the increased willingness of the poor to apply for and take social assistance reflected the change in societal norms about welfare that constituted a shift from welfare as a privilege the state accorded the needy to welfare as an entitlement.²⁷ Piven and Cloward, however, argue that the poor became less willing to "regulate themselves" or internalize society's dominant norms of self-sufficiency that had previously discouraged them from seeking welfare for fear of being stigmatized as "dependent."²⁸ For Grønbjerg, the new climate conducive to the poor's taking welfare was reflective of society's growing commitment to welfare as entitlement. For Piven and Cloward, the new climate represented a breakdown in the social order and an increase in political instability. For Grønbjerg, liberalization of the poor's access to welfare was something the top or center of society extended to the bottom or periphery as reflective of a changing society. For Piven and Cloward, the poor's increased access to welfare represented something the bottom or periphery forced the top or center to accord them in order to maintain the status quo.

The parallelism between these two perspectives intensifies when we consider that both offer conflicting interpretations of how the "economic rights" of citizenship have emerged. In recent writings, Piven and Cloward have argued that while the initiation and liberalization of welfare programs since the Great Depression were originally co-optative, they simultaneously created the conditions for ending the cyclical nature of public welfare and starting a more democratic political economy based on the idea that "democratic rights include economic rights."²⁹ They, however, still see the welfare explosion of the late 1960s and the early 1970s as a manifestation of the social control function of public welfare and the tendency of public welfare to expand only in the face of political instability and civil disorder.³⁰ For Piven and Cloward, economic rights have been achieved through conflict and struggle. For Grønbjerg, economic rights have been achieved through peaceful social and economic development.

Stephen M. Aigner has suggested that the parallelism between these two competing perspectives lies in their imputing different motives to social welfare policymakers. We think not. Both perspectives are struc-

tural and functional explanations of welfare's role in society. Therefore, both deemphasize the long-run significance of motives and volitional behavior and emphasize the functional necessities to which institutions in societies conform. Although both perspectives may include within them a space for motives in affecting institutional stability and change, their purposes are not to explain changes in welfare policy in terms of the character, personality, or intentions of specific actors. In other words, the debate between these perspectives is not over the benevolence or malevolence of social welfare policymakers. It is over the functional obligations of social welfare policy in recent years.³¹

Whither Mass Society?

Given the extensiveness of the data Grønbjerg presents to buttress her argument, her research cannot be dismissed lightly, and any critique of it must include alternative data analysis. Three major problems in Grønbjerg's empirical analysis stand out.

One is that Grønbjerg's analysis represents a form of the classic methodological problem in the social sciences of "misplaced concreteness." Her analysis is fundamentally flawed because it rests its conclusions on a firm empirical base that may not be related to those conclusions. Specifically, Grønbjerg goes to great lengths to suggest that since the more urbanized, industrialized, and professionalized states had relatively higher welfare roll growth in the 1960s than other states, that welfare growth must be due to the development of a "mass society." Grønbjerg makes the case that urbanization, industrialization, and professionalization are all indicators of the development of a "mass society" that is committed to a broad conception of citizenship and, as a result, more liberal social welfare policies. These factors, however, could also be nothing more than indicators of economic development and all the social and economic problems endemic to such development. That is, more economically developed states tend to have more of the social and economic problems that are addressed through the expansion of social welfare programs.

Through stepwise multiple regression, Grønbjerg finds that in 1960 indicators of need for social assistance in state populations better explained the relative levels of the AFDC rolls across the states than did indicators of the relative levels of modernization or development of "mass society" in the states.³² Grønbjerg's multivariate analysis for 1970, however, indicated that measures reflective of the development of "mass society" in the states had joined measures of need as the best predictors of relative levels of AFDC rolls across the states.³³ In addition,

she found that mass society indicators were important contributors to explaining variation across the states in the relative levels of growth in their AFDC rolls from 1960 to 1970.³⁴ Grønbjerg also buttressed her analysis by reporting that during the 1960s almost all states made their eligibility standards more lenient, and states with relatively strong “mass society” characteristics were more apt to have higher application and approval rates for AFDC, indicating their relatively stronger commitment to affording welfare to those who needed it.³⁵

The problem of “misplaced concreteness” begins with Grønbjerg’s operationalization of “mass society.” Using factor analysis, Grønbjerg arrives at a set of indicators that are distinct from measures of need and which, she suggests, are reflections of modernization or movement by a state toward “mass society.” These measures include: voter participation, median education, percentage of the work force deemed professional, urbanization, industrialization, and per capita revenue collected by the state.³⁶ Grønbjerg emphasizes that these indicators are related and, according to factor analysis, constitute elements of a factor or dimension of her state data. Yet, there is an insufficient basis in her discussion for assuming that these are indicators of states tending toward a “mass society” that is given to expanding its concept of citizenship to include welfare as an entitlement. At best, these are indicators of modernized, economically developed states. To imply more than this is to transform data analysis into speculation. To suggest that economically developed states became in the 1960s more committed to welfare as an entitlement relative to other states is to make a leap of faith that Grønbjerg’s data cannot sustain. Instead, it is distinctly plausible to infer from these data nothing other than that more economically developed states tended to have relatively higher increases in their AFDC rolls in the 1960s.

The problem of “misplaced concreteness” continues in that Grønbjerg’s evidence for the “mass society” thesis is thinner than we are led to believe. It is based largely on the results of multiple regression analysis of the AFDC rolls in 1970. In this analysis, we find that the percentage of broken families (an indicator of need, not “mass society”) is far and away the most important determinant in explaining variation in the level of the AFDC rolls across states. Grønbjerg rests her case at this juncture on the fact that in 1970 as opposed to 1960 two “mass society” indicators (per capita revenue and percent high school educated) contributed somewhat to explaining the variation of AFDC rolls across the states.³⁷ How this implies evidence for the “mass society” thesis remains the subject of speculation. The fact remains that a basic indicator of need for social assistance remains the overwhelmingly most important determinant of variation in state AFDC rolls in 1970. Grønbjerg goes on to find that “mass society” indicators were better predictors of AFDC roll growth from 1960 to 1970 than measures of need. Unfortunately,

Grønbjerg only provides simple correlations here and eschews multiple regression, thereby preventing us from estimating the effects of each factor on AFDC roll growth controlling for other factors. In the end, this very exhaustive, concrete presentation of data allows us to imply no more than that economically developed states had more rapid AFDC roll growth in the 1960s compared to other states. While this may be a manifestation of "mass society," it may also be a manifestation of many other things.³⁸

A second problem in Grønbjerg's analysis is a substantive one. She implies that the growth of the welfare rolls as a manifestation of the expansion of citizenship is a progressive development in our society. As such, it should not be interpreted as a manifestation of the state's role in mature capitalistic societies of acting to control the poor and thereby perpetuating the legitimacy of a class-based society. Yet, by simply calling welfare an entitlement that comes with an expanded form of citizenship, Grønbjerg did not show that welfare growth was unrelated to social control functions in economically developed communities. In fact, the welfare entitlement of expanded citizenship may be nothing more than an artifice of the state's social control mechanisms. Grønbjerg may only be developing euphemisms for the functional responsibilities of the state in an advanced capitalistic society. In this sense, her problem is one of mischaracterizing the subject under study. Her labels imply that welfare growth as a manifestation of the expansion of citizenship is a good, unrelated to the social control functions of the state. Yet, accepting her labels, one can still argue that the functional consequence of the expansion of citizenship is the enhancement of the state's ability to control people. It is important to bear in mind that labeling something does not mean we have explained it.

The third problem in Grønbjerg's analysis is her failure to test for the social control interpretation of the welfare explosion. This is a glaring oversight in light of her attempts to conclude that her analysis presents a refutation of Piven and Cloward's work. Actually, her empirical evidence could be used to buttress the social control argument as well as the mass society argument for the welfare explosion. The following analysis seeks to provide an alternative empirical test to Grønbjerg's in a way that allows us to distinguish results that support one interpretation over the other.

Data Analysis

Like Grønbjerg, we focus our empirical analysis on welfare growth within each of the fifty states rather than for the nation as a whole.

By examining a series of units, we can assess variation in indicators of “mass society” and need for social control so as to determine which are associated with welfare growth. We choose states, rather than other units such as localities, because they have substantial latitude in how they administer AFDC.³⁹ We employ multiple regression that enables us to assess which of a number of factors best explains variation across states in the growth of their AFDC rolls. Our analysis includes indicators that Grønbjerg suggests reflect “mass society”: percent of work force deemed professional, median years of formal education, percentage of population living in central cities, interparty competition, and voter participation. Grønbjerg also includes per capita revenue as an indicator of the effort a state makes to raise revenue relative to its resources. Tax effort, we feel, is a better measure of “mass society” because it reflects the willingness of a state to tax itself for public purposes given its capacity to do so.⁴⁰ Our analysis also includes an indicator of the state’s need for social control. We use an index of the severity of rioting in the state from 1965 to 1968.⁴¹ We include indicators of the relative level of need of the state population for social assistance: unemployment rate, black net in-migration, and the percentage increase in poor female-headed families.⁴² We also include median income as a measure of the state’s capacity for providing social assistance irrespective of its willingness, and average community action expenditures per poor person as an indicator of community action efforts to increase the poor’s access to social assistance.⁴³

Table 1 presents the results of our regression analysis and indicates that median income and the severity of rioting are the measures most strongly associated with variation in 1960–70 state AFDC roll growth while controlling for other factors. The indicators of “mass society,” other than tax effort, are not strongly related to variation in state AFDC roll growth in the 1960s once we take other factors into account. Table 1 also presents the results on variation in state AFDC roll growth for 1969–70. We examined 1969–70 for three reasons: (1) this was the first year after the period of major rioting (1965–68), (2) this was the first year after the national government took a series of actions to liberalize AFDC, and (3) 1969–70 had the largest annual growth rate for any year since the program’s inception.⁴⁴ The results indicate that the severity of rioting is the most important factor in explaining variation in AFDC roll growth across the states for 1960–70. Once again, indicators of “mass society” in the states, other than interparty competition, do not relate to variations in state AFDC roll growth, once other factors, such as a state’s need for social control, are taken into account.

We do not wish to suggest that our empirical analysis represents definitive evidence that states liberalized the poor’s access to welfare strictly in response to the intensity of rioting they suffered. Nor do we wish to imply that our evidence serves as a conclusive basis for

Table 1

FACTORS AFFECTING AFDC ROLL GROWTH 1960-70 FOR THE 50 AMERICAN STATES

	INCREASES IN AFDC FAMILIES PER 1,000 POOR FAMILIES			
	1960-70		1969-70	
	<i>r</i>	Beta	<i>r</i>	Beta
Median income74	.65*	.64	.37*
Severity of rioting61	.34*	.69	.53*
Unemployment11	.12	.09	.12
Poor female-headed families50	-.06	.40	-.13
Tax effort12	.24*	.03	.10
Voter participation30	.14	.22	-.15
Interparty competition51	.03	.50	.38*
Median education42	-.02	.37	.15
Black migration49	-.16	.42	-.11
CAP expenditures39	-.08	.31	-.05
Workforce professionals (%)53	.10	.38	-.08
Central city (%)38	.12	.31	.10
<i>R</i> ²	.73		.70	

NOTE.—Figures in the “*r*” column indicate the simple correlation between each independent factor and the dependent factor. Figures in the “Beta” column indicate the standardized regression coefficient between the independent variable and the dependent variable controlling for all other factors and are the result of simple multiple regression.

* *F* is significant at the .01 level.

rejecting the “mass society” thesis and accepting the social control thesis. Instead, our findings suggest that once one undertakes an empirical test that distinguishes evidence for one thesis over the other, the social control thesis finds more support in the data than the “mass society” thesis. Contrary to recent claims, the available data do not favor the “mass society” thesis.⁴⁵

David A. Rochefort has recently written,

It is a serious weakness in progressive and social control perspectives that they rely heavily on assumptions concerning the “true” nature of man or the state. Whether these assumptions are positive, as in the case of progressive theory, or negative, as in radical theory, they are intrinsically unverifiable. . . . In this sense, neither the progressive nor the social control perspective really constitutes a model developed through scientific inquiry; they are, instead, systems of values and beliefs reflecting the political philosophies of liberalism and Marxism, respectively. Ideology, not observation and inductive reasoning, largely determines how these prevailing theoretical models of social welfare policy view their subject.⁴⁶

Rochefort is correct to suggest that these two dominant perspectives on social welfare policy are essentially philosophical and value-laden. Yet Rochefort is wrong on two counts. First, given our data analysis, we feel it is possible to provide empirical evidence that suggests which of these perspectives is most relevant for characterizing the welfare

explosion of the late 1960s. Second, the solution to the philosophical and value-laden nature of these perspectives is not to cast them aside in search of “scientific,” value-neutral perspectives on social welfare policy. Such alternatives do not exist. Social theory is inherently tied to values and normative judgments.⁴⁷ The solution to the philosophical character of social theory is to extend our analysis to these implicit philosophical assumptions, and then, on the basis of both philosophical argument and empirical documentation, to assess the validity of one perspective over the other. Our analysis has sought to contribute to the empirical dimension of the debate between these perspectives as they relate to explaining the welfare explosion.

Conclusion

Given the confluence of factors directly related to the growth of the AFDC rolls in the 1960s, emphasis on one factor to the exclusion of the others obviously represents an incomplete and mischaracterized explanation of the dynamics behind the welfare explosion. Neither the “mass society” nor the social control perspective is really a monocausal explanation of the welfare explosion. Instead, they are theoretical perspectives that establish the logic underlying the dynamics involved in the welfare growth of the 1960s. Grønbjerg’s thesis is flawed not because it emphasizes one factor to the exclusion of others. Instead, the “mass society” thesis represents a misleading characterization of the dynamics behind the welfare explosion. It attempts to explain the dramatic growth in families receiving AFDC in the very salubrious, benign terms of society according the poor economic entitlements. Yet it does so on the basis of data that can also be interpreted to imply that the state, in the economically developed setting of advanced capitalism, with its low-wage secondary labor markets and superfluous underclasses, has a functional imperative to extend welfare to the poor so as to regulate them. Given our examination of data that enable us to distinguish findings supporting one interpretation over another, we must conclude that much doubt remains as to the superiority of the “mass society” explanation of the welfare explosion over the social control thesis.

Notes

1. David A. Rochefort, “Progressive and Social Control Perspectives on Social Welfare,” *Social Service Review* 55 (December 1981): 568–92.

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2. Kirsten A. Grønbjerg, *Mass Society and the Extension of Welfare, 1960–1970* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977).
3. Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, *Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare* (New York: Vintage Books, 1971), pp. 222–47.
4. *Statistical Abstract of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1961–76).
5. Between 1960 and 1965, the rolls grew 41 percent; between 1965 and 1970, 83 percent; 1970–75, 75 percent; and 1975–80, 6 percent. The largest yearly growth occurred from 1969 to 1970 when the rolls grew 36 percent. In 1960, there were 745,300 families receiving AFDC; by 1975 there were over 3.35 million families on AFDC (see n. 4 above).
6. Roger Beardwood, “The Southern Roots of the Urban Crisis,” *Fortune* 78 (August 1968): 80–87, 151–52, 155–56, as discussed in Piven and Cloward, *Regulating the Poor*, pp. 183–226.
7. Daniel P. Moynihan, *The Negro Family: The Case for National Action* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Labor, Office of Planning and Research, 1965). Levitan et al. have written, “In 1972 a third of all nonwhite families were female-headed—more than three times the proportion among white families and a substantial increase over the 22 percent of all nonwhite families with female heads in 1960” (see Sar A. Levitan et al., *Still a Dream: The Changing Status of Blacks since 1960* [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975], p. 114). Yet, Lurie has noted that even if all of the new white and nonwhite female-headed families in the period between 1959 and 1966 had received assistance, only about 10 percent of the AFDC increase during that time period would be accounted for (see Irene Lurie, *An Economic Evaluation of Aid to Families with Dependent Children* [Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1968]).
8. See Harrel R. Rodgers, Jr., *The Cost of Human Neglect: America’s Welfare Failure* (Armok, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1982), pp. 77–83.
9. James T. Patterson, *The Welfare State in America, 1930–1960* (Durham, England: British Association of American Studies, 1981), pp. 20–32.
10. See John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, *The Trend of Social Movements in America: Professionalization and Resource Mobilization* (Morristown, N.Y.: General Learning Press, 1973); Daniel P. Moynihan, “The Professionalization of Reform,” *The Public Interest* 1 (Fall 1965): 6–16; and Patterson, p. 32.
11. Martin Anderson, *Welfare: The Political Economy of Welfare Reform in the United States* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), pp. 154–55.
12. Rochefort, pp. 568–92.
13. Piven and Cloward, *Regulating the Poor*, pp. 8–22.
14. Harold L. Wilensky, *The Welfare State and Equality* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975).
15. See Rochefort, p. 576.
16. Morris Janowitz suggests Grønbjerg’s work “transforms” the sociological analysis of welfare. See his foreword to the book.
17. Grønbjerg, p. 11.
18. *Ibid.*
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 14–16.
20. On the idea of parallelism in social theory, see Michael A. Simon, *Understanding Human Action: Social Explanation and the Vision of Social Science* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982), pp. 196–99.
21. Grønbjerg, p. 161.
22. Piven and Cloward, *Regulating the Poor*, pp. 3–38.
23. Grønbjerg, p. 158.
24. Piven and Cloward, *Regulating the Poor*, pp. 7–8.
25. Grønbjerg, pp. 8–20.
26. Piven and Cloward, *Regulating the Poor*, p. 38.
27. Grønbjerg, pp. 147–48.
28. Piven and Cloward, *Regulating the Poor*, p. 167.
29. Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, *The New Class War: Reagan’s Attack on the Welfare State and Its Consequences* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982), and “The American Road to Democratic Socialism,” *Democracy* 3 (Spring 1983): 58–69.

30. Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, "Humanitarianism in History: A Response to the Critics," in *Social Welfare or Social Control? Some Historical Reflections on Regulating the Poor*, ed. Walter I. Trattner (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1983), pp. 114–57.

31. Stephen M. Aigner, "Social Development and Mass Society: Iowa," *Social Service Review* 56 (September 1982): 375–92, at 379.

32. Grønbjerg, chap. 5.

33. *Ibid.*, chap. 6.

34. *Ibid.*, pp. 111–19.

35. Aigner, pp. 377–79.

36. Grønbjerg, pp. 104–6.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 102.

38. See Eugene Smolensky's review of Grønbjerg's book in the *Journal of Economic History* 38 (June 1978): 545–46.

39. See Grønbjerg, pp. 20–30.

40. Our "mass society" factors are calculated to reflect the state's conditions during the 1960s, and therefore each one is an average of the state's standing on that factor for 1960 and 1970. Voter participation is the average turnout in the 1960 and 1968 presidential elections. Interparty competition is a summary measure derived from Austin Ranney, "Parties in State Politics," in *Politics in the American States*, ed. Herbert Jacob and Kenneth Vines (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1971).

41. The severity index is the summation of the standardized Z-scores for the number of civilians killed and injured, the number of law officers killed and injured, the number of arrests, and the number of arsons during riots between 1965 and 1968. Cronbach's α for this index is .90 and indicates sufficient commonality to use them in one index. The index correlates with the number of riots ($r = .80$) in our state data. We, however, use the index rather than the frequency of rioting because we feel it is a more meaningful measure of the extent to which each state was wracked by rioting in the 1960s. Although we recognize that rioting occurred before and after the 1965–68 period, we feel our data cover all the major riots and provide a sound base for indicating the relative levels of rioting across the states. Our data are derived from U.S. Senate, Government Operations Committee, Permanent Subcommittee on the Investigations, *Staff Study on Major Riots and Civil Disorders, 1965–68* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1968).

42. The unemployment rate is the average for all years in the 1960s. Black net immigration is for 1960–70. Percentage increase in all families that are poor and female-headed is for 1960–70.

43. All data other than that on the riots are from *Statistical Abstract* (n. 4 above).

44. These liberalizations included the abolition of residency requirements and man-in-the-house rules, and the initiation of income disregards, self-declaration of eligibility, and the right to a fair hearing before being denied or terminated from welfare. Also by 1969, the Work Incentive Program (WIN) was implemented by the federal government and represented the one restriction to AFDC to be implemented during this time. For an in-depth analysis of postriot AFDC increases, see Sanford F. Schram and J. Patrick Turbett, "Civil Disorder and the Welfare Explosion: A Two-Step Process," *American Sociological Review* 48 (June 1983): 408–14.

45. See Aigner, p. 379.

46. Rochefort, pp. 587–88.

47. Simon, pp. 196–99; and Harry J. Kienzle, "Epistemology and Sociology," *British Journal of Sociology* 21 (December 1970): 413–24.