time working with the EU than France or Britain is not so much, as Schmidt claims, that they have similar systems of governance as that they have both been more Europhilic and neo-liberal than the others.

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Making Political Science Matter: Debating Knowledge, Research, and Method
Sanford F. Schram and Brian Caterino
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Making Political Science Matter is a response to Making Social Science Matter: Why Social Inquiry Fails and How It Can Succeed Again by Bent Flyvbjerg, Professor of Planning at Aalborg University, Denmark (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Making Political Science Matter is a collection of fourteen essays on methodological issues in political science. Its overarching aim is “to move the conversation forward in the hopes of seeing the possibility of a rejuvenated political science” (11).

Part one of the book comprises four essays that frame the methodological problem in contemporary political science in terms of an opposition between emulating the methods of natural science versus doing what Bent Flyvbjerg calls phronetic social science. The methods of natural science are associated with the dominance of the positivist behaviourist approach in political science, the use of statistics, large samples, prediction and testing falsifiable causal hypothesis in order to produce universal generalizations and general laws. By contrast, Flyvbjerg claims that if political science is to matter the core questions should be “Where are we going? Who gains and who loses and by what mechanisms of power? Is this development desirable? What, if anything, should we do about it?” (76). The aim of political science, then, would be “to restore ... political science to its classical position as a practical intellectual activity aimed at clarifying the problems, risks, and possibilities we face as humans and societies and at contributing to social and political praxis” (68).

In his essay Sanford Schram highlights and defends Flyvbjerg’s point of view by supporting research that is problem driven in the sense that political scientists use appropriate methods (whether historical, qualitative case studies, interpretive, critical, or context-sensitive) in order to answer the questions they pose. For Schram political science matters if it helps social actors use knowledge to address their problems. But the centrepiece of this section is a vitriolic dispute between Flyvbjerg and David Laitin. Laitin argues that political science should adopt a scientific frame in which scholars are “concerned about uncertain (ex ante) conclusions, public procedures, careful measurement, rules of inference, rewards for replication” (40) and should use a tripartite method comprised of formal modelling, statistical analysis and narrative. According to Laitin, Flyvbjerg’s phronetic social science should be incorporated into a scientific approach to political science. To oversimplify the debate, Laitin judges Flyvbjerg’s stance to be deficient because Flyvbjerg rejects the use of statistical analysis and formal modelling. In response, Flyvbjerg asserts that Laitin misrepresents his position. Patrick Thadeus Jackson weighs into this debate by arguing that framing debates over methods in terms of gut-instinct versus numbers, or subjectivity versus science, is due to oversights concerning the aims of research, the nature of social life and the grounds of particular positions. This part concludes with an explanation by Corey Shdaimah and Roland Stahl about how political science mattered in helping to understand the state of affairs and to shape policy regarding low-income home repair in Philadelphia.
Part two of the book consists of a collection of diverse comments on aspects of Flyvberg’s position. Not only does Theodore Schalzki assert that social science has already abandoned the attempt to emulate natural science, but he also argues that Flyvberg and other political scientists should not give priority to analyzing power but should also pay attention to gender, identity, culture, rationality and the nature-technology-society constellation. Brian Caterino argues that Flyvberg’s focus on strategic power which is predominantly coercive neglects communicative power, a type of power constituted by “the ability to orient and bind action through mutual understanding” (138). In an interesting essay Mary Hawkesworth points out that rather than framing the debate between natural science and social science we should be asking “To whom do we want political science to matter? For whom, on whose behalf should it matter? What are the consequences of political science mattering? To what end?” (154). This section ends with a chapter by Steward Clegg ponderously teasing out a nexus of power, history and imagination, and Leslie Paul Thiele discussing why the work done by psychologists and neurologists on tacit knowledge and intuition in practical judgment matters to political science.

The chapters in part three of Making Political Science Matter explore the practices of political scientists. Peregrine Schwartz-Shea comments on the challenge researchers face in becoming capable of handling various methods in light of the American Political Science Association Task Force’s support of specialization of university programs and the psychology of ingroup-outgroup mentalities among political scientists (219). Gregory Kasza offers a way graduate studies can respond to make political science matter to students—to reflect on their own lives, study the lives of others (history), and read political theory. David Kettler’s reflections on Franz Neuman’s study of the separation of political theory and empirical political science in the 1950s and 1960s, and Nueman’s interesting work on bureaucracy and power, highlight how far contemporary political science has strayed from mattering to anyone. Finally, in the context of identifying connections among control and freedom and governance Timothy Luke emphasizes that we must ask Flyvberg’s question “Where are we going?” Luke’s answer is that “where we are going is tied to a subpolitical expertise, or a tacit consent to trust scientific experts and business owners to do what allegedly is best for the common good in accord with prevailing scientific and business practices” (237). Yes, the methods of political scientists certainly matter!

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Homeless and at Home in America: Evidence for the Dignity of the Human Soul in Our Time and Place
Peter Augustine Lawler
South Bend IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2007, pp. 229, index
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“We Americans are the most homeless and the most at home people of the West today” (1). This is the central paradox of Peter Augustine Lawler’s latest book, Homeless and at Home in America. It is a collection of essays (some previously published elsewhere) on a wide variety of topics, from Rod Dreher’s Crunchy Cons and bioethics to Casablanca and Tocqueville. The chapters, though, fit well together and are linked by a set of related themes. The book, written in Lawler’s usual engaging and often humorous style, presents a fascinating argument from one of the chief proponents of what he calls the “‘crowd’ of American faith-based, non-libertarian, Strauss influenced thinkers” (Stuck with Virtue, Wilmington: ISI Books, 2005, viii). This group is part of a growing school of thought Lawler refers to as “conservative postmodernism—